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This paper is motivated by the observation that children in land-rich households are often
more likely to be in work than the children of land-poor households. The vast majority of
working  children  in  developing  countries  are  in  agricultural  work,  predominantly  on
farms operated by their families.  Land is the most important store of wealth  in agrarian
societies and it is typically distributed  very unequally.  These facts challenge the common
presumption that child labour emerges from the poorest households. We suggest that this
seeming paradox can  be explained by failures of the markets for labour  and land. Credit
market failure will tend to weaken the force of this paradox.  We model these effects and
estimate the model on data from rural Pakistan and Ghana. A striling finding of the paper
is that,  after  controlling  for  household  consumption  and  other  covariates,  the  wealth
paradox persists for girls but, for boys in both countries, it vanishes.
Keywords:  child  labour,  poverty,  female  education,  agricultural  households,  Ghana,
Pakistan
JEL Classification: J22, 015Non-Technical  Summary
The vast majority of working children  in developing countries work on farms run
by their own households.  Children working for wages in export sectors (e.g. sports-goods
and carpets) that have attracted public  attention are a tiny fraction of the children that do
not attend  school.  Popular discussions  of adult  minimum  wage  laws  are  more  or  less
irrelevant  to  the  question  of addressing  child  farm  labour  since  the  adults  in  these
households  are typically  self-employed.  Similarly,  trade  sanctions  are  unlikely  to have
any effect on these children unless the agricultural  produce  is exported  and is subject to
sanctionsl.  In order to address the question  of what policies  might be most effective  in
addressing child farm labour, we need to understand its causes. We started  by looking at
child  and  household  level  data  on  farm  labour  in  the  two  very  different  farming
environments  of Ghana  and Pakistan.  This yielded the remarkable  observation  that,  on
average,  the children of land-rich  households are more likely to work and also less likely
to  be  in  school than the  children of land-poor households.  Since  land  is  the  most
important store of wealth in agrarian  societies and a substantial  fraction of households do
not own  land, this challenges the commonly held presumption that child labour emerges
from the poorest households
What can explain  the lower school attendance  and greater  work participation  of
larger land-owning  households in both countries? We suggest that this seeming  paradox
can be explained by what economists would  describe  as "imperfections"  in the markets
for both labour and land.  In the ideal world, land-owners would hire adult workers  and
send their children to school. However,  in rural areas,  labour needs are seasonal  so there
are times when lots of people have no work and other times when it can be hard to find
workers,  especially  since  labour  mobility  appears  to  be  limited.  This  problem  is
reinforced  by the  fact that family members  are easier to supervise than casual  workers.
So, if there is a big farm that needs labour, it can be very productive for the household to
employ  its  children.  Since  the output  generated  by an additional  worker is  larger  on a
larger plot of land,  the  incentive  to hire  one's own  children  as farm  labour  is  greater
amongst large land-owners.  There is therefore likely to be some land size up to which this
incentive dominates the wealth effect of owning more land.
Is this bad for the child? This is unclear.  It depends on the quality of the schools
accessible  to the child  and the kinds of work available  upon leaving  school. These are
weighed  up  against  the  rewards  to working  on  the  farm.  These  include  not only  the
current  increase  in farm yield but also  the value  of the  work experience  gained by the
child. This work experience is especially valuable for the children (especially the sons) of
landowners, who can expect to inherit the farm. If land could quite easily be bought and
sold, then the incentive to gain specific work experience would be weaker. An active land
market would  also tend to reduce the effects of the labour problems.  In this sense,  land
market failure reinforces  labour  market  failure.  The theoretical  literature  on child labour
has tended to emphasize  credit market failure  to the  relative neglect  of labour and land
market failure. Credit market failure means that not everyone can borrow  as much as they
like and, in a rural society, households that can offer land as collateral are less likely to be
credit-constrained  than  others. Thus,  credit market  failures actually  weaken  the force of
the "wealth  paradox".
Whether the effect wil l be positive or negative is a firther question.We model these different effects in this paper and estimate the model on data from
rural  Pakistan  and Ghana.  A  striking  finding of the  paper  is that,  after controlling  for
household  consumption and other covariates of child labour,  the wealth  paradox persists
for girls but,  for boys in both countries,  it vanishes. Although boys are more likely than
girls to inherit  land  in the two countries  studied,  they also tend to get higher monetary
rewards from their education than girls. The results in this paper seem to suggest that the
rewards from education outweigh the rewards from work experience for boys. Moreover,
since boys rather than girls traditionally look after their parents in their old age (except,
possibly,  amongst  the A=n  in  Ghana)  this  may  motivate  parents  to  invest  more  in
ensuring that they grow up.to be rich.Child Farm Labour :The Wealth Paradox
Sonia Bhailotra  and Chris  HeadY*
1. Introduction
This paper is motivated to explain the remarkable observation that, on average, the
children  of land-rich  households  are more  likely to  work and also  less likely to be  in
school than the children of land-poor households. We observe this tendency in household
survey  data  for rural  areas  of Ghana  and Pakistan  (Table  3, discussed  in  Section 4.3).
Since  land  is the  most important  store of wealth  in agrarian  societies and a substantial
fraction  of households  do not own land,  this challenges  the commonly held presumption
that  child labour  emerges  from the  poorest  households  (e.g.,  US  Department  of Labor
(2000), Basu and Van (1998)).
Child labour in export industries like  carpets, garments and sports equipment has
captured public  attention and stirred a debate on trade sanctions and international  labour
standards  (see  Basu,  1999,  for a  survey).  Yet  obscured  from  the  public  eye,  the vast
majority of working children in developing  countries are engaged  in agricultural  labour,
predominantly  on  farms  operated  by  their  families  (see  ILO,  1996).  The  available
theoretical and empirical literatures  on child labour are not well-equipped  to explain this.
The theoretical literature on child labour has emphasised  credit market imperfections (see
Ranjan  (1999),  Lahiri  and  Jafarey  (1999))  to  the  relative  neglect  of labour  market
imperfections.  Indeed, a well-functioning  labour market is central to the seminal paper on
the economics of child labour by Basu and Van (1998). This paper emphasises that'labour
market failure may explain the paradoxical fact that the children of asset-rich  households
are  often  more  likely  to  be  in  work  and  out  of school  than- children  in  asset-poor
households. We  also argue that the effects of labour market imperfections  are reinforced
by ill-functioning land markets, whereas credit market failure creates an opposing effect.
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Programme.Ownership  of productive  assets  such as  land  can  influence  child  labour  in  the
following ways. There is the standard  wealth effect whereby  large landholdings  generate
higher income  and, thereby,  make it easier for the household  to  forego the  income that
child work would bring.  Capital market imperfections  that result in lower interest rates for
households that can offer land as collateral will reinforce the wealth effect, allowing large
landowners to borrow more to fulfil insurance needs  or to finance the child's education.
Working against these effects is the fact that the marginal product of labour is greater the
greater  is the stock of productive assets. This raises the return to child labour and thereby
encourages  it. If labour markets  were perfect and  the landowning  household  could both
hire  in workers and monitor them effectively, then this incentive effect would disappear.
There is also a reinforcing dynamic  effect on marginal productivity that depends on the
relative  effectiveness  of work experience and education  in raising the future  earnings of
the child. This,  in tum, depends upon the structure of inheritance norms and the degree of
development  of land  markets.  These  different effects  are  specified  in  Section  3 in the
context of a two-period model of child labour in a peasant household.
Motivated  to  separate  the wealth  effect  from the  other  (substitution)  effects of
farm size, our empirical  model departs from most other specifications in the literature by
including both land size in acres and a measure of permanent income. While our data do
not  permit  us  to  disentangle  the  labour  market,  credit  market  and  inheritance  (via
experence/education)  effects  of farm  size, separating  the wealh  effect  is an  important
step forward. It permits analysis of the effects of income transfers versus land reform, for
example.  Our  specification  also  improves  upon  existing  work  in  controlling  for
alternative  forms  of land  tenancy,  and  in  instrumenting  both  of the  key  variables  of
interest: income and farm size.
The paper is organised  as follows.  Section 2 briefly surveys the relevant literature.
Section  3 presents  the  theoretical  model.  Section  4  describes  the  data by gender  and
country. It presents the remarkable  data on child work and school  participation rates  by
land ownership.  It also discusses relevant contextual  features of Ghana and Pakistan. An
empirical specification  is discussed  in Section  5.  The results are presented  in  Section 6,
and Section 7 concludes.
22. Relevant Literature and Contributions of this Paper
2.1. Modelling : Causes of  Child Labour
As indicated in Section 1, the literature  on child labour has not given much room
to labour market  failure.  Basu and Van  (1998) assume  that subsistence  poverty  drives
child  labour  and,  in  fact,  the  mechanics  of the  model  depend  upon a well-functioning
labour  market.  Basu  (2000)  extends  this  analysis  to consider  the  effects  of an  adult
minimum wage on child labour. While these papers make an important contribution in (a)
highlighting the role of poverty and (b) analysing the effects of policies that have recently
been  much  discussed,  these  policies  are  of limited  relevance  to  a  majority  of rural
households  whose  main  income  derives  from  self-employment2. Other  authors  have
emphasised  that child  labour can  arise as a result of credit market  constraints  (Ranjan
(1999),  Lahiri  and  Jafarey  (1999))  or  the  problems  of inter-generational  contracting
(Baland and Robinson, 2000). Eswaran (2000) and Cigno and Rosati  (2000) model  child
labour as codetermined with fertility.
2.2. Modelling: The Agriciudural  Household
The  empirical  fact  that by  far the  majority  of working  children  in  developing
countries work on household-run  farms  and enterprises  motivates a focus  on modelling
the peasant  household.  In  an early contribution,  Rosenzweig  and Wolpin (1985) use an
overlapping  generations model  incorporating  returns to specific experience to show that
extended families, the cost advantages of family relative to hired labor, and the weakness
of the  land  market  may  be  manifestations  of an  optimal  implicit  contract  between
generations  that  maximizes  the  gains  from  farm-specific,  experientially  obtained
knowledge.  The canonical model of the consuming and producing agricultural household
is now  probably that  of Strauss  (1986).  Benjamin  (1992)  extends  this  to  show  that if
consumption  and  production  decisions  are  separable  then  total  labour  usage  on  the
household  farm  will  be  independent  of household  composition.  However,  if labour
markets are imperfect, then separability is violated and farm labour usage is a function of
household composition. In an interesting extension of this model, Cockbum (2000) shows
that,  in the non-separable  case,  child labour  is a function of the stock of land and other
2 On this,  see  Bhalotra (1999).  There  is the  separate  problem  that minimum  wage or other  legislation  is
very difficult to enforce  in a rural setting where  the legal  infrastructure is underdeveloped  and the political
infrastructure may be "captured"  by powerful groups in society such as employers.
3assets3. In  an application  to  Ethiopia,  Cockburn  finds that  some  assets  (e.g.,  livestock,
land)  increase child  labour  in Ethiopia while others  reduce  it (e.g., oxen,  ploughs). He
does not consider the other potential effects of ownership of productive  assets and, in his
empirical model, he does not condition on household income. The coefficient on the asset
variable therefore compounds the income and substitution effects4.
In this paper,  we develop a theoretical model that clarifies  the role of labour and
land market failure as distinct from the role of credit market failure. Our model thereby
integrates the different sorts of market failure in to one model and  indicates the potential
role  of  the  phenomenon  of  interlocking  factor  markets  in  rural  economies  in
understanding  the  "wealth  paradox".  Allowing  two  periods  enables  us  to discuss  the
effects  on future wages of the current decision on whether to work or attend school,  and
to relate these to land size via inheritance. The roles of inheritance and of the limitations
of land markets appear not to have been discussed at all in the context of child labour. To
the extent that inheritance  laws  favour sons over daughters,  incorporation  of this feature
into a model of child labour holds the potential  to explain the marked gender differentials
in child labour and schooling that are evident in many developing countries.
2.3. Evidence:  Studes of Child  Labour
Early  empirical  work  on  child  labour  consisted  largely  of case  studies  that
interviewed  working  children.  Large  scale  representative  household  surveys  have  the
advantage  of providing  information  about  children  who  do and  do  not work,  thereby
making it possible to investigate  the decisiqn to work. Since these large  survey data have
become  widely  available  in  the  last  decade,  economists  have  estimated  reduced  form
participation  equations for child work and schooling for a range of countries5. This work
has  not been  motivated  to test  any  particular  hypothesis  but  it  has  contributed  to  an
increased understanding of  the correlates of child labour.
Many of these studies include a  measure of household income or consumption, the
adult wage rate,  or assets. The results are mixed, and this is not entirely surprising for the
3 Bhalotra and Heady (1998),  in an earlier version  of this paper, presented a similar argument,  describing
the fact that land ownership will create both 'wealth'  and 'wage' effects on child labour.
4 Interpretation  of Cockburn's results is further  limited by the fact that he enters  assets  in terms of number
of items  (e.g. number of livestock)  rather than in terms  of their  value.  The fact that  a cow is likely to be
more valuable (or income-producing)  than a plough is hence not allowed for.
5 For example,  see Canagarajah  and Coulombe  (1998),  Grootaert  and Patrinos  (1998), Jensen and Nielsen
(1997), Kassouf (1998), Patrinos and Psacharopoulos (1997), Ray (2000), Blunch and Vemer (2000).
4following  reasons.  The  effects  of productive  assets  on  child  labour  will,  as  we  have
highlighted,  tend to confound  wealth and substitution  effects.  Moreover,  most existing
studies do not instrument household income and this will tend to create an upward bias in
its coefficient6. In addition, available  studies have tended to aggregate child work on the
household  farm  or enterprise  with work for outside employers  and also  with domestic
work where  the relevant data are  available.  It has also tended  to pool data for rural  and
urban sectors of the economy  and for boys and girls. If there are negative income effects
in some sub-groups  but not others, aggregation  will tend to obscure them. In an analysis
of adult  labour  in India,  Rosenzweig  (1980) presents  formal  models  of labour  supply,
making  and  emphasising  the  distinction  between  landholding  and  landless  rural
households. This is, of course, relevant to child labour as well.
In order to identify the effects  of living  standards on child  labour, our empirical
specification  addresses  each  of  these  three  issues7. We  include  measures  of  both
permanent  income  and  size  of landholding.  Both  of these  variables  are  treated  as
potentially  endogenous.  A  comparison  of estimates  with  and  without  instrumental
variables on our data underline the importance of IV. We estimate gender-specific models
for each country, restricting our sample to children in rural areas who live in households
that own  or operate  some land.  Neglecting  to select  out the landless  households would
bias the coefficient on farm size. Indeed, our investigation of this showed that every other
variable  in the equation was wiped out by the stunning explanatory power of farm size
when  the  equation  was  estimated  on a  sample  including  landless  households.  Finally,
while existing  work has tended to concentrate  on the participation  decision, we  explain
6  See,  for  example;  Psacharopoulos  (1997),  Patrinos  and  Psacharopoulos  (1997),  Kassouf  (1998),
Canagarajah  and  Coulombe  (1998),  Kanbargi  and Kulkarni (1995),  Grootaert (1998),  Blunch and Verner
(2000).  Grootaert (1998) acknowledges that income (or expenditure)  is likely to be endogenous  and argues
that this is dealt with in his analysis of child labour in the Cote d'Ivoire by replacing income with a dummy
for whether  or not the  household falls  into the  lowest income  quantile.  In  fact, this  dummy is of course
endogenous as well- the author does not solve the problem  by throwing away information on income. Ray
(2000) also uses a dummy for whether the  household is above  or below a poverty line but he  deducts the
child's  contribution to  household  income  (using  certain  assumptions  to  impute  a wage to unpaid  child
workers).  This will not solve the endogeneity problem if child and parent labour  supply are simultaneously
determined.  Bhalotra  (2000b)  finds  evidence  that  parent  and  child  labour  supply  are  indeed  jointly
determined in rural Pakistam
7 Bhalotra (2000a) takes the bolder approach of arguing that the question of whether poverty compels child
labour cannot be addressed  by estimating the income  effect on child  labour since a negative effect  would
only indicate that  child  leisure (or schooling)  is a normal  good.  This  paper proposes that the sign of the
wage  elasticity  of child  hours  of work  provides  the  more  evident  test  of the  poverty  hypothesis.  It  is
estimated  on data for children  in wage work.  This paper concentrates  on the more prevalent  farm work and
the analytically distinct question of the wealth paradox.
5hours  of work.  This  is  because  data on hours  of work  of children  exhibit  substantial
variation,  with  many  children  working  less  than  10  hours  a  week.  From  a  policy
perspective,  participation  at 10 hours a week is rather different from participation  at 40
hours a week.
2.4. Evidence: Imperfections in the Rural Labour Market
Using  data  from  the  Peruvian  Sierra,  Jacoby  (1993)  shows  that  the  marginal
product in own-farm  work (for adults)  is not equal to the  market wage, an indication of
distortions  in the labour market.  Deolalikar and Vijverberg  (1987)  present evidence that
family and hired labour are not perfect  substitutes. For example, family members may be
easier  to  supervise  than  casual  workers.  Direct evidence  of moral  hazard  in  the rural
labour  market  is  found  in  Foster  and  Rosenzweig  (1994).  These  observations  are
reinforced  by the limited extent to which the wage labour market  has developed in rural
areas of Ghana and Pakistan  (see  Section 4.2), although it is growing.  Moreover,  labour
needs in rural areas are seasonal, so there are times when lots of  people have no work and
other times when it can be hard to find workers. So, while in the ideal world, land-owners
would hire adult workers to till their  farms and send their children to school,  in reality
incentives and constraints may combine to make them employ their own children.
3. A Two-Period Model of Child Labour
This  section  develops  a  model  of the  peasant  household  in  an  economy  with
imperfect  markets  for  labour,  land  and  credit.  Allowing  two  periods,  we  are  able  to
capture  the  impact of child  work  in period  I on  productivity  in period  2.  This  arises
through  both  the  gain  in  work  experience  and  the  possible  lowering  of educational
attainment. The model specifies the effects of farm size on child labour which, in addition
to a wealth effect, include substitution  effects arising on account of market imperfections.
Separating  the  substitution  and  wealth  effects  has  policy  relevance.  For  example,  the
relative efficacy of land reform and income transfers in reducing child labour will depend
upon the relative size of these effects.  Our model shows that this will  hinge not only on
preferences  and the long run net returns  to work  experience  and education,  but also  on
whether the effective choice is between work and school or between one of  these
6activities and leisure, as well as upon the extent of labour market failure relative to credit
market failure8.
3.1. Model Specfifcaton
Consider a peasant household containing parents and children which has no access
to a labour market. Divide its life span into two periods. In the first, the parents produce
output  on  the  farm  using  land,  their  own  labour  and  possibly  their  children's  labour.
During this first  period, the  children  may  also attend  school.  In the  second  period, the
children  have  grown  up and  may  even have  left  the  family  home,  but the  household
continues to value their consumption as part of the household's total.
In the  first  period,  superscripted  1, household  income  is  given  by  a  farm
production function:
y'  = Fl(A,L',Ll)  (1)
where A is land area and L is labour, with the subscripts p and c differentiating  between
labour supplied by parents and children.  It is analytically convenient to assume that these
households  neither  buy nor sell  labour  but  if, in  fact,  the household  can  trade  on the
labour market, their net income will still depend on the variables included in Fl.  In such a
case, this function can be re-interpreted as a net income function and the analysis below is
unchanged.  Only if the labour market were perfectly competitive would the results below
change fundamentally.  However, we have argued  in Section 2.4 that this  is unlikely. In
the  second  period,  the  children  may  have  left  home  and  their  contribution  to  family
income is separate from household farm production. Household income is then given by:
y2 =F2 (AEL,)+  W2(S,Lp).EL  (2)
where we have allowed the child's wage in the second period to be a function of her first
period labour supply .(Lcl)  and schooling (S). W does not have to be an explicit wage:  if
the child grows up to work on her own farm, W is her marginal product.
8 In the interests of simplicity,  the model presentation  suppresses the important distinction between  boys and
girls as  well  as a number of other influences  on  child  labour.  These  factors are,  however,  included  in the
estimated model.
7The household utility function is separable between the two periods:
U = U'(X,LP,,,L2,S) +IU 2(X2,L2,,LC)  (3)
where  X  is consumption.  We  assume that children under  15  do not  bargain with their
parents.  Their  only  fallback  option  may be  to run  away  from  home  and  this may be
thought especially unlikely among land-owning  households  since children may expect to
inherit the land if they remain attached to the household. It may be important to allow the
child labour decision to be influenced by the relative bargaining powers of the mother and
the father of the child (e.g. Galasso,  1999).  Although our data do not have variables such
as individual assets (extra  environmental  parameters"-  see McElroy,  1990)  that can be
used to denote these relative powers  in an empirical model,  we include  an indicator for
female headship and measures of the education of the mother and  father and expect that
these will capture the relative power of  women  in decision-making.
The household inherits  some (positive or negative) financial  wealth from a period
zero that is not modelled. Call this K°. Then financial wealth in  period 1,  Kl, is given by:
K' = K0 + F'(A,L,,Le,)-Xl -C(S)  (4)
where C(S)  is the cost of schooling and the price of consumption  is normalised  to unity.
The financial wealth  available to the household in period 2 will depend on that in period
1, but will also depend  on the household's access to financial  services.  Under imperfect
capital markets, the interest rate  facing  the household will depend  upon its wealth.  For
households with negative financial wealth (debt), the interest rate will additionally depend
on  characteristics  that  affect  their  perceived  credit-worthiness  including  personal
characteristics  (Z)  and  ownership  of land  (A).  Indeed,  Swain  (2001)  finds  striking
evidence of this in the Puri district of Orissa in India, where both access to loans and the
interest rate paid are a function of land owned.  Let us represent this relationship  between
wealth  in the two  periods by the  function K2= G(K',A;  Z).  This implies  the  following
budget constraint for period 2:
X2 = F2(A, L2,) + W,2(S,Ll)L2V  + G(K', A;Z)  (5)
8The household attempts to maximise (3) subject to (4) and (5).
3.2. The First-Order  Conditions
The  first-order  conditions  most  relevant  to  the  child  labour  decision  are  as
follows:
-2'  =0  (6)
8G  % 2 2I =0  (7)
aS  -dS  +  as  <
where  Xi  and X 2 are the Lagrange multipliers on (4) and (5), and the inequalities  in (8)
and  (9) become  equalities  when  child  labour and schooling,  respectively,  are  positive.
The work-leisure  choice is made with reference to equation (8). This states that the value
of the  marginal  product of child  labour  in the  first period  plus the  value of the  wage
increase in the second period (arising from work experience)  must be less than or equal to
the marginal  (dis)utility of work. Equation  (9) has a similar interpretation  for the choice
between  leisure and school attendance.  Combining (8) and (9) gives:
ou'  au,'  )+A  aF'  dC  2  2  _W_2 _W2
{at  dS  +  *{t  +  221=2  w2 . ow 2 f  (10)
which is the relevant  condition if hours of child leisure are  fixed and one  is interested in
the reallocation of an hour of child time from work to school. Note  that child  labour
supply  in period  I will be zero if (8)  is satisfied by an inequality when evaluated  at zero
9hours. This would be equivalent to the implicit wage being below  the reservation  wage.
Thus, a tobit model is used to take account of the  fact that the left-hand side  variable is
constrained to be non-negative.
3.3. The Estimated  Equation
The choice  variables  can  be expressed  as  functions of the  exogenous variables,
land  size  (A)  and  initial  wealth  (K). Substituting  out the  terms  in condition  (8)  and
solving gives us an expression  for the quantity of interest,  namely the quantity of child
labour supplied in period 1:
Ll  =H(A,K°;Z,e)  (11)
where Z is a vector of observable  household characteristics that affect the objectives and
constraints  of the optimisation  problem.  Unobservable  characteristics  and  optimisation
errors are captured  by the random variable,  e. Equation  (11) cannot be estimated directly
because  initial  financial  wealth,  Ko,  is  unobservable.  This  difficulty  is  dealt  with  by
noting that consumption in period  I is also a choice variable,  and therefore a function of
all the variables on the right-hand  side of (10). This function can be inverted to give:
K° =K(A,X';Z,e)  (12)
It is then possible to substitute (12) into (I1), to obtain:
L' =H'(A,X';Z,e)  (13)
It is this equation that we estimate.
3.4. Farm  Size: Substitution and Wealth Effects
Interpretation of the parameter estimates of (13) requires an understanding of how
the estimated coefficients  relate to standard concepts in the theories of labour supply and
10household  decision-making9. This  is  best  achieved  by  analysing  the  Hicksian  supply
function for child labour that follows from the household maximisation problem:
L' = L  (w¢,v, h,  r, U;Z,e)  (14)
where  w.'  is  the  implicit  wage  for  child  labour  in  period  1, obtained  by  partially
differentiating  the production  (or net  income)  function, v is the marginal  effect of work
experience on the second period wage, h is the marginal effect of schooling on the second
period wage, r is the  (marginal) interest rate implied by the function  G, and U is utility.
The  second  period  child  wage  does  not  appear  in  (14)  because  it  is  endogenous,
determined  by  v  and  h  via the  effect that  they  have  on  the  allocation  of child  time.
Parents'  wages  do  not appear  because  we assume  that  child  labour  is  separable  fiom
parent  labour  or  that  parents'  labour  supply  has  only  income  effects  on  child  labour
supply10.
Differentiation of the labour supply function in (14) gives:
c  +tcs  ACl&811  8 1 8L'  +  Lc  (15)
c  cI  a,,  ah  &  AUi
The  last tem  in (15)  is a wealth  effect.  The first four terms on the  right-hand  side are
substitution effects which, as we shall see, arise on account of various market failures.
Consider how changes in land holdings (A) influence these five terms, and hence
the  supply  of child  labour.  (i) An  increase  in  the  land-labour  ratio  will  increase  the
marginal productivity of labour (higher implicit wage)l 1. If labour markets are imperfect
and it is difficult to hire in workers, then this will encourage  child work on the household
farm.  This is reflected  in the first termn on the right of (15) being positive. Under perfect
labour markets, this effect would be zero. (ii) An increase in land owned will lower the
9 Several  empirical  studies  of child  labour include  one or both of these  variables  but,  typically,  with no
attempt at interpreting their coefficients  in the context of a theoretical  model.
10 This assumption  is investigated in Bhalotra  (2000b) using the  same data source  for rural  Pakistan  and
distinguishing wage work and work on household farns and enterprises.
1  1 Household size  and composition  are held constant through Z.  Thus an  increase in land is an increase  in
the land-labour ratio.effective interest rate faced by households because of the value of land as collateral.  This
effect is reflected as a negative sign on the fourth term on the right of (15) and it would be
zero  if capital  markets  were  perfect  as  interest  rates  would  then  be  independent  of
household wealth.
The effects of land holdings on the second and third terms on the right-hand side
of (15)  will depend  on whether land  is inherited and  how active  a land market there  is.
For children  who do not expect  to inherit  the family farm  or who can  expect to  sell  it
when they grow up, the effect of schooling or work experience  on their adult wages will
be independent of the size of the farm of their childhood.  (iii) However,  for children who
do  inherit  the  family  farm,  the  importance  of agricultural  skills  (as measured  by the
absolute  increase in  income earned by increased  skills) will be greater the larger the farm.
In this case, v is  increasing  in  A, and the  second term on the right hand side of (15) is
positive. (iv) If schooling also increases agricultural  skills, h is increasing  in A, resulting
in a negative sign on the third term in (15). The evidence of positive schooling effects on
agricultural productivity  is mixed and may be expected to depend, amongst other things,
upon  the  degree  of technological  change  and  dynamism  in  agriculture  (Rosenzweig,
1995)12.  It is common  knowledge  that land markets  are weak  in most rural  economies
(see Rosenzweig  and Wolpin,  1985,  for example), and Swain (2001) presents some recent
evidence from India. We do not have information on which children  stand to inherit the
farm  but,  to the extent that boys are more  likely to inherit than  girls,  these substitution
effects  will be larger for boys.  Since the effects  associated with v and  h take opposing
signs, whether their joint effect makes the land-size  coefficient  more or less positive  for
boys as compared with girls is an empirical  question.
The final term in (15) will be negative  because higher permanent income, ceteris
paribus, is expected to reduce child labour supply. We have so far considered  the effects
of changes  in land  size on child  labour.  In fact, there will be  effects of land size  on the
amount  of labour  performned  by  parents.  Under  our  assumption  of weak  separability
between  parent  and  child  labour  supply,  these  effects  are  captured  by the  permanent
income (consumption) variable in the empirical model.
12  Bekombo  (1981),  for  instance,  emphasises  the  importance  of work  experience  for  children  in  rural
Africa. Weir  and Knight  (2000) present evidence  that educated  farmers are both early innovators and  more
likely than the less educated to adopt available methods.
12If households  have  sources  of financial  wealth  other  than  land,  then  cross-
sectional  differences  in consumption  will  reflect  differences  in total  wealth  rather than
just differences  in land  ownership.  This will not affect any of the  substitution  terms in
equation  (15),  and  will only  have  an  income  effect.  This income  effect  in  the  model
comes through the shadow prices, X' and X 2, with a high price being associated with a low
level of permanent  income.  Under perfect  capital  markets,  lower income will  create an
equal proportionate  increase  in X' and A 2 (see equation (7)). It follows from  (8) that this
will  result  in  an  increase  in  child  work.  This  negative  income  effect  is  unambiguous
because we assume that the marginal utility of labour is negative. In (10), where leisure is
fixed and the effective choice is between work and school, there is no income effect if the
marginal utilities of work and school  are the same. A negative income effect in this case
depends upon the (plausible) assumption that work is more unpleasant at the margin than
school (aUlI8L,1 - al'iaS  <0).
Credit  constraints  will  reinforce  the  negative  income  effect  on  child  work  for
perfect  capital markets. This  is because  low-income  households  are more  likely to face
credit  constraints A sudden reduction in a household's  finances will increase  the current
period's  shadow  price,  X1,  without  a  corresponding  increase  in the  shadow  price  for
period 2,  A 2 , resulting in an  increase  in child work in the current period.  (The vector Z
therefore  includes  variables  that  capture  the  economic  vulnerability  of the  household
(Section 5.).
Thus, controlling  for current-period  consumption  in addition  to farn  size offers
the folowing  advantages.  (1) It aDlows  for income  effects on child  labour arising  from
sources of wealth other than land. (2) It allows us to interpret the farm size coefficient as
the  net result of different  substitution  effects.  Without  consumption  held constant,  this
coefficient would combine income  and substitution effects.  (3) Investigating the effect of
household poverty on child labour is of direct interest.
4. Data and Descriptive Statistics
The data are drawn from the Ghana Living Standards Survey  (GLSS) for 1991/2
and  the  Pakistan  Integrated  Household  Survey  (PIHS)  for  1991.  These  are  large
nationally  representative  surveys  collected  by  the  respective  national  governments  in
cooperation  with the World Bank. We select the rural sample of each  survey. The GLSS
collects data on employment for persons 7 years or older whereas the cut-off is at the age
13of 10 in the PIHS. The structure and coverage of the two data sets is sufficiently similar to
allow some interesting cross-national comparisons.
4.1. Activity Rates and  Hours of Work
This section refers to Tables I and 2, which profile participation rates and hours in
work and school for 7-14 year olds in Ghana and  10-14 year olds in Pakistan.  In Ghana,
1% of boys  and  34%  of girls  undertake  work on the  household  farm.  In Pakistan,  the
corresponding participation rates  are 22% and 28%13.  Farm work  is, on average,  a half-
time job for  children.  There  is wide dispersion  in work hours  around the  mean,  which
underlines  the  importance  of explaining  hours  and  not just  work  participation.  The
question of whether child labour is a "bad thing" or whether some farm work may just be
good exercise  and practical training  depends upon  the hours  spent  in such work and the
extent to which it conflicts with school14.
Of Ghanaian  children who work  on the  household  farm,  three  in four boys and
two in three girls  are at the  same time  in school.  In Pakistan,  this is true of one in two
boys. Girls in Pakistan are  in a class apart, as only one in ten of those who work on the
farm attends school.  It would appear,  therefore,  that combining  farmwork and school  is
considerably  easier in  Ghana than in Pakistan  and that it is especially  difficult  (or not
preferred)  for  Pakistani  girls.15 Heady  (1999)  finds  that  working  affects  school
performance  in  Ghana,  even  though  it  does not affect  school  attendance.  This  is not
surprising  since  the  hours  of work  involved  are  not trivial.  We  do not  have the  data
required to investigate school performance in Pakistan.
A  striking  difference  between  the two  countries is that a  significant  fraction  of
children in Pakistan are engaged in work outside the household, whereas child
13  For all types of work except housework, this refers to the answer to the question: "how many hours per
week did you normally work?"  Only 5 children reported  working at more than one occupation at the same
time,  so  secondary  work  was  ignored  in  the  interests  of simplicity.  Individuals  may  be  engaged  in
housework as well as the main occupation.
14 Cigno, Rosati  and Tzannatos  (1999),  for example,  find no  difference  in the  health  status of working
children and school-going children in India and they find that children that are neither  in work nor in school
are the least healthy.
15 The correlation  of school attendance  (a binary variable for the individual)  with work-participation  and
hours of work  was  examined  for 7-17  year olds,  holding constant age, household  size,  current  household
expenditure  per capita,  and  all  cluster-specific  effects.  The conditional  correlation  of work  participation
with school participation  in Ghana is  (unexpectedly)  positive  but increasing  hours of work did appear to
reduce  the  probability  of school  attendance.  In  Pakistan,  both  participation  and  hours of child  work  are
negatively correlated with school attendance  (results available from the authors).
14participation  in wage work in Ghana is close to zero. School attendance in Pakistan shows
a remarkable  gender differential,  much  greater  than that in  Ghana.  In both countries,  a
substantial  proportion  of children  neither  work  nor  go  to  school  and  this  fraction  is
especially  large  among  girls.  Therefore,  if the  main  concern  is  with  low  educational
attainment (and the gender gap therein), then policies designed to discourage child labour
may  be  rather  less  important  than  policies  that  directly  promote  school  attendance
(Ravallion and Wodon (2000) find support for this for the case of Bangladesh).
4.2. Land Scarcity, Land Use and  Poverty
Ghana and Pakistan pose some interesting contrasts. There is greater land scarcity
in  Pakistan  than  in Ghana.  Likely  related  to  this,  the  wage  labour  market  is  better
developed  in Pakistan than in rural Ghana (eg. 36% of adult men work for wages in rural
Pakistan  and  only 22%  in  rural  Ghana).  These  facts  suggest  both  a  higher  marginal
productivity of child labour, and greater difficulty  in hiring-in adult labour in Ghana, and
they therefore  lead us  to expect more  children  to be employed  on household  farms  in
Ghana  than  in  Pakistan.  This,  as  we  have  seen,  is  born  out  by  the  data  (Table  1).
However,  this does not  imply  that children  are  better off in Pakistan.  Compared  with
other developing countries, Pakistan has a relatively high rate of child wage employment-
about  10% of 10-14 year-olds. Moreover,  children  in Ghana are better  able to combine
farm work and school attendance than are children in Pakistan  (Table 1). Our data show
that households that send children in to wage work are poorer on average than households
that employ children on the family farm. Overall,  there is a higher incidence of poverty in
Pakistan  as  compared  with  Ghana  (Ray  (2000)  estimates  that  27%  of households  in
Pakistan  fall below  the median  income  per adult-equivalent  as compared  with  14%  in
Ghana).  The two  countries  also exhibit  very  different  patterns  of land use.  It is much
more  common  in  Ghana  than  in  Pakistan  for a  household  to operate  land that  is  not
owned.  Also,  a given  household  in Ghana  may have more than  one  plot of land,  with
ownership  divided  even between  husbands  and  wives-  this is  uncommon  in  Pakistan.
Finally,  the  data  in Tables  1-3  indicate  a much  wider  gender  gap  in  child  labour  in
Pakistan than in Ghana.
15Table 1: Child Activities
Wagea wrk  11.9%  0%  0%
Blks  Gixls  Bap  Ghi
Total Participation Rates
HouseholdFarm  work  22.1%  28.1%  40.5%  34.4%
Household  Enterprise  work  2.3%  1.6%  1.8%  2.5%
Wage work  6.2%  11.9%/  0%/  0%/
School  72.8%  30.5%  76.5%  68.9%
None of  the above activities  14.0%  42.4%  12.7%  20.1%
Domestic work  n.a.  99.4%  89.8%  96.2%
Participation In One Activitv
Farm work only  8.6%  21.1%  10.6%  9.8%
Enterprise  work only  0.64%  1.2%  0.3%  1.2%
Wage work only  3.2%  6.8%  0%  0%
School only  61.3%  27.6%  45.0%  43.3%
Work Combinations
Farm & enterprise work  0.91%  0.09%  0%  0%
Hhfarm & wage work  2.1%  4.1%  0%  0/O
Hh enterprise  & wage work  0.25%  0.27%  0%  0%/O
Work & School
Farm  work & school  10.5%  2.7%  29.9%  24.6%
Enterprise work & school  0.50%  0%  1.5%  1.3%
Wage work & school  0.74%  0.73%  0%  0%/
Number of  children  1209  1096  1718  1542
Notes: Rural areas. Ghana. 7-14year-olds, Pakistarr  10-14year-olds.
Table 2: Weekly Hours of Child Farm Work
Househoid farm  Wage work
Ghana  boys  15.5 (13.3)
N=696
Ghana  girls  15.4 (12.9)
N=531
Pakistan boys  22.5  (18.5)  44.9 (22.3)
N=267  N=61
Pakistan girls  13.3  (13.8)  30.9 (15.6)
N=308  N=73
Notes: Hours are values  reported for the reference  week, conditional  on participation in
the activity  in the reference  week. Figures  in parentheses are standard deviations  around
the  means. N is the number of working children.  For Ghana the data refer to 7-14 year
olds and for Pakistan to 10-14 year olds.
164.3. The Wealth Paradox
As  this is the  focus of the  current paper,  Table 3a  presents  the data on  child work
(farm work as well as total work) and  school participation  by land  ownership  (0/1)  and
size of land owned. Let us first compare households that own  no land with households
that own  some.  In Pakistan  where 33% own land, the probability  of both all-work  and
farm  work  in  Pakistan  is  substantially  higher  amongst  landowners  than  amongst  the
landless!  This is reflected  in the school attendance  rates of girls being higher in landless
households.  However,  in the  case  of boys,  the wealth  effect  appears  to  dominate  and
school attendance  is higher amongst the landed. In Ghana  where 44% of households own
land, the patterns conform to expectation with the children of landowning households
Table 3a: Participation Rates by Land Owned
Land Group  /H  school  Farm work  All work
Boys  Girls  Boys  Girls  Boys  Gis
PAKISTAN
Own Land=1  33  76.7  27.6  31.0  36.4  33.0  43.9
Own Land=O  67  70.7  32.7  17.0  22.9  24.4  32.9
Marghial  9  77.8  24.6  29.1  36.5  31.6  47.8
Small  12  73.0  26.7  34.1  38.0  36.6  44.0
Large  9  79.1  29.6  31.1  36.5  31.8  39.7
GHANA
Own Land=l  44  81.9  75.7  49.7  46.8  52.9  50.5
Own Land=0  56  73.5  66.7  55.6  48.8  57.6  51.4
Marginal  12  80.3  76.6  44.3  43.9  47.5  47.7
SmaUl  19  83.7  79.7  45.9  47.1  50.7  512
Large  13  80.5  69.7  58.5  48.5  59.7  51.5
Notes: In column 2,  %/6H  refers to the % of households that fall into the category indicated  in
column 1. 1 hectare (h)= 2.7 acres. Land size is grouped as follows: Marginal  is <lh, Small
is  1-3h,  Large is >3h.  This  is the  classification  used  by  the Indian  census  and  we  have
adopted  it after checking  that  it is a useful  categorisation  for the  Pakistan and  Ghana data
sets. All work refers to participation in any of three activities: work on household farns, work
on household enterprises, and work on the wage labour market. It is not the inverse of school
attendance because there are children who are neither in work nor in school (see Section 4.1).
17being more likely to be in school and less likely to be in work than the landless, although
the difference in probabilities is rather smaller than one might have expected.
Now  condition  on ownership  and consider  size of land owned (marginal,  small and
large  farmers, percentages of each  shown  in column  2 of Table  3a), to allow for likely
non-linearities arising from the sizes of both the wealth and the substitution effects  being
a function of land-size. Now the wealth paradox is apparent in both countries. In Pakistan,
there  is an  evident non-linearity:  most of the  increase  in work  participation  occurs  in
moving from the marginal to the small class. After that, there is a small decrease, leaving
work  participation  rates  in the  large  landowning  class  similar to those  in  the marginal
landowning  class. For  boys,  this is mirrored  in school  attendance.  In the case of girls,
while their farm  labour participation  responds to land  size in  a similar  fashion to boys,
their wage labour participation  drops with land size. As a result, the total work rates and
also the  school  attendance  rates  of girls  increase  monotonically  with  land  size. This is
consistent with the finding that income effects for girls are typically larger than for
boysl6. In Ghana. the probability of farm work and all-work increases steadily with land
size for boys and  girls.  School  participation  increases  from  marginal  to small but then,
surprisingly,  decreases  from small to large  farms. The fact that school participation  does
not mirror work participation  in Ghana as well as it does in Pakistan  is consistent with the
fact that it is easier to combine work and school in Ghana.
Often farming households operate land without owning it. In Pakistan, this is done
either by  leasing  it in or by sharecropping.  In  Ghana, additional  possibilities  are use of
"free  farms"  or  village  farms.  Table  3b  describes  work  and  school  participation  of
children by land used (operated) rather than land owned. It is convenient to think of land
used  as  reflecting  opportunities  in  the  way  that  land  owned  does,  but  without  the
corresponding  wealth  (and inheritance)  effect.  In line with this, the paradoxical  patterns
are rather stronger here than in Table 3a. The farm employment rates of Pakistani girls are
now higher  on large farms  than  on small. For all-work,  girls'  employment displays  an
inverted  U-shaped  relation  with  land  size,  similar  to that  observed  for boys.  This  is
mirrored in school attendance.  Remarkably, the school attendance rates of girls and boys
16 Isolating  wage  work  in rural  Pakistan,  Bhalotra (2000a)  shows  that the  income  effect  on the  labour
supply of girls  is twice  that on the labour  supply of boys.  This is also the finding  in some other  studies.
Behrman  and  Knowles (1999) survey income elasticities  of school enrollment in developing countries  and,
here again, we see a larger elasticity for girls than for boys. Thus, for example, if there is an income shock,
daughters are likely to be withdrawn  from school before sons are.
18Table 3b
Participation Rates by Land Operated
Land Groip  /,H  Shool  Farm work  AJl work
Bys  |  Girls  Boys  Gis  Boys  Girls
PAKISTAN  l  l
Use Land=1  43  72.0  25.2  32.9  39.1  35.0  46.5
Use Land=O  57  73.5  35.7  20.7  28.0
Marginal  9  74.5  28.3  24.5  39.0  28.6  51.0
Small  20  71.0  21.9  34.8  35.7  36.3  42.9
Large  15  72.0  27.6  34.4  43.1  36.2  48.7
GHANA  l
Use Land=1  90  77.8  71.1  52.4  47.5  55.1  50.7
Use Land=0  10  89.2  76.3  9.6  15.8
Marginal  27  84.3  79.1  44.8  42.7  48.8  46.7
Smal  40  77.0  71.0  54.2  48.3  57.0  51.4
Large  23  72.7  62.8  57.4  51.4  58.6  53.2
Notes:  Land operated includes  land  owned and  land  used under  rental  or  sharecropping
arrangements or else as free or village land. The cells for farm work are blank for households
that do not operate land since farm work refers to farm work on the household-run  farm.  See
Notes to Table 3a.
in  large-farm  households  are  lower  than  in  marginal-farm  households.  For  Ghana-
employment  rates  behave  similarly  to  the  case  of  land  owned.  However,  school
attendance now decreases  steadily in size of land operated.
Overall, there  is considerable  support  for the notion  that landholdings,  whether
owned  or just  operated,  increase  the  probability  that  children  work  and  decrease  the
probability that they attend school. This "wealth paradox"  seems more evident for girls
than for boys. These data are truly remarkable,  given that we tend to associate poverty  in
rural  economies  with  low levels  of land  ownership  and  to associate  child  labour  with
poverty.  Since child labour on the household-run farm is easily the most common form. of
child labour, these data deserve investigation.
5. An Empirical Model  and Estimation Issues
This  section  discusses  the  translation  of the  theoretical  model  in  to  a model
estimable on the data we have. As indicated  in Section 1, the available data do not permit
19separate identification  of the different substitution effects but they do allow us to separate
these from the wealth effect of  land.  Since not all children have the option to work on the
family farm, we use the sub-sample of households that own or operate land. The deendent
variable in  the  hours  of child  work  on  the  family  farm.  In  rural  Pakistan,  33%  of
households own land and 46% operate land. Ownership,  at 44%, is not dissimilar in rural
Ghana but there are more ways of sharing land and 900 % of households operate  some land
(see column  2, Tables 3a, 3b).  Since many children do not participate  in farn  work,  we
use the tobit estimator.  All  reported  standard  errors are robust  (e.g.  White,  1980),  and
adjusted to permit observations  within clusters  (primary sampling  units) to be correlated
(e.g. Deaton, 1997).
5.1. Variables
The  measure  of land size  is  acres  of  farm  land  owned  or  operated  by  the
household17.  In  a  departure  from  existing  studies  of child  labour,  we  also  include
indicators  for the mode of operation of land (sharecropping,  rent in both  countries and,
additionally,  whetherfree  or village land in  Ghana)18. For  Ghana,  we  have  a  further
variable which records the number ofplots of land This is less relevant in Pakistan where
family land holdings tend to be consolidated and jointly operated, in contrast to regions of
sub-Saharan  Africa where men and women often have their own plots. Unfortunately, our
data  for  Ghana  do  not  permit  us  to  assign  the  plots  to  individual  members  of the
household.  Household  income  is  proxied  by food  expenditure per capital 9,  which
includes  the  imputed  value  of home-produced  consumption.  This  is  expected  to  be
smoother  than  actual  income  (see  Altonji,  1983).  Even  though  rural  economies  are
characterised  by imperfect  capital markets,  there is some  evidence that poor households
achieve a degree of consumption smoothing (see Townsend (1994) for example).
As a measure  of household  insecurity,  we  include  an  indicator  for whether  the
household  has a female head. The equations  include  a quadratic  in child age. Since the
17 We investigated  using land owned instead  and the results are qualitatively  similar.  The marginal product
or "wage" effect of land-size is likely to be similar for land owned and land operated. However, the wealth,
collateral  and inheritance-related  effects will tend to be stronger in the case of land owned.
18  One rationalisation  of the benefits to the landlord  from pursuing  sharecropping  instead of renting the
land out or hiring wage labour in, is that it improves the landlord's access to labour by making available  the
labour of the tenant's family in addition to the labour of the tenant (see Basu, 1997, for example).
19  There  is no  need  to  assume  a equivalence  scale  because  size and  detailed  household  composition
variables  are  included  in the equations.  Food  expenditure  is preferred  to total  expenditure  because  the
latter will include expenditures on durables which are not as smnooth.
20incentive to put a child to work on the fann depends upon the size of the farm  relative to
the  size  of  the  available  pool  of  family  labour,  we  include  household  size  and
composition  as regressors.  Given fanm  size, we expect household  size to have a negative
impact on child work.
Parents'  wages are proxied  by mothers' and  fathers' age and educational level.
To the extent that womens'  education reflects their bargaining power (by virtue of being
an  asset that  they  can take away  with  them  if they  leave  the  household),  inclusion  of
mothers'  education as distinct from  fathers'  education goes some way towards relaxing
the unitary modelling  assumption  implicit  in (1). These variables  may also  have  direct
effects if children with better educated  parents derive  more from their education,  or are
likely to be better informed in job-search (this will affect the dynamic retums to education
versus work).  We  further relax  the  simplicity  of the theoretical  structure  by allowing
parents to have preferences over children that depend upon birth order  (evidence of such
effects is, for example,  in Das Gupta (1987) and Butcher and  Case  (1994))  and on  the
relation of the child to the household head. Alternative  relations include  niece,  nephew,
grandchild,  sibling, and it is not unusual  in Ghana to find foster children in the household
(see Ainsworth,  1996).
Province dummies  are  included  to  capture  variation  in  productivity  or  labour
demand.  Rather  than  measure  expenditure  on  schooling,  we  use  dummy  variables  for
whether a primary, middle and  secondwy school are present in the community where the
child lives. Access may further be  influenced by whether there  is public transport  in the
community.  We  include  religion  and  ethnicity  variables  in  order  to  capture
attitudinal/cultural  differences in the valuation of school and work. This is expected to be
especially  relevant  when  looking at  girls,  towards  whom  attitudes  tend  to incorporate
greater heterogeneity. Some other community-level  characteristics are included so as to
control for work opportunities as well as norms at a finer level of disaggregation  than the
province.
Means for the sub-samples of working and non-working  children are in Appendix
Tables I and 2. The variables used differ between the countries to some extent because of
differences  in the questionnaires.  A comparison of means across these sub-samples,  and a
comparison  of means  across  the  two  countries  can  be  found  in  Bhalotra  and  Heady
(2001).
215.2. Potential Endogeneity of Consumption a,id Land Operated
Since  child  labour  contributes  to household  income,  food  consumption  (which
proxies permanent income) is potentially endogenous. As children working on the family
farm are not paid a wage, their contribution cannot be deducted from total  income. Even
if we  could  observe  child  income,  the  endogeneity  problem  would  not be  resolved  by
subtracting  it from  the total  since the  labour supply of different household  members  is
likely to be jointly deternined20. We therefore  instrument household consumption  using
the cluster (or community) level going wage rate for men in agricultural work, as well as
indicators  of the level  of infrastructural  development of the community  (e.g.  is there  a
railway line, is there a market, is there electricity,  is there piped water, etc.). It may also
be  argued that the  size of land operated  is endogenous:  families with  large numbers  of
children may  lease  in  more land  in order  to be able to employ them productively.  We
therefore  instrument total land-holdings with size of land owned, an index of inequality in
the  distribution of land  within  the community,  and with the  same  set of infrastructure
indicators. Land owned and land inequality may be expected to be good predictors of land
leased in or out and therefore of total landholdings.  It is reasonable to assume  that land
owned is exogenous  on the grounds that buying and selling of land is limited by a very
weak  land  market  (e.g.,  Swain  (2001),  Rosenzweig  and  Wolpin  (1985)).  We  use  the
generalised  residuals  procedure which  Smith and Blundell  (1986) show  gives consistent
estimates when the dependent variable  is censored.  Suppressing individual subscripts,  let
the main equation, for hours of work (H), be written as:
H==XP+Yfy+e  (19)
where hours  (H) is a censored endogenous variable, X is a vector of exogenous variables
and  Y  is  the  endogenous  variable.  The  auxiliary  equation  describing  Y  in  terms  of
exogenous variables Z (Z includes X) is:
Y=Z7r+u  (20)
The error terms  e and u are assumed  to be jointly normally distributed.  Let e= ua + e.
Substituting for e in (19) gives the conditional model,
H  =XP3+Yy+ua+s  (21)
20 Bhalotra (2000b) rejects  the exogeneity of both mother's  and father's  labour supply  in  an equation  for
child labour supply.
22where u is an estimate obtained by OLS estimation of (20), and (21)  can be estimated by
the  standard  tobit  procedure.  A test of a=0  is a  test of the  null  hypothesis  that  Y  is
exogenous.
6. Determinants of Child Work
We first  present estimates  of a  parsimonious  model corresponding  to equation
(13), in which the only variable in the vector Z is household size (Table 4). Estimates of
Table 4: Child Work on the Household  Farm: Parsimonious Model
Marginal Effects
Pakistan  Pakistan-  -Ghana  Ghana
boys  gilss 
ParticiDation
Probabilities
Log p.c. food expend (0.1)  -0.026***  -0.010  0.012***  0.0095**
Acres (I acre) x 102  0.026  0.15**  0.41***  0.60***
Acres2 (1 acre) x 104  -0.31*  -0.30
Household size (1 person)  -0.021***  -0.013***  0.0098***  -0.0069
Residual (lpcfdexp)  0.022***  0.017**  -0.006  -0.000053
Hours Conditional
on Work
Log p.c. food expend (0.1)  -0.68***  -0.18  0.22***  0.16**
Acres (1 acre) x  102  0.68  2.70**  740***  10.20***
Acres2 (1 acre) x 104  -5.50*  -5.10
Household size (I person)  -0.54***  -0.25***  0.18***  -0.12
Residual  (lpcfdexp)  0.59***  0.030**  -0.11  -0.0009
513  473  1272  1127
N
Log likelihood  -969.82  -901.27  -2895.3  -2278.3
Notes: Figures are marginal effects at sample means for the change indicated in parentheses in
column  1.  Based on tobit estimnates with Dependent variable:  hours worked by children on the
household  farm.  Sample:  Rural  households that  operate  some land.  ***,  **  and  * denote
significance  at the  5%,  10%  and  12%  levels  respectively.  The regressions  included  region,
religion and ethnicity dummies.  Since some regions for Ghana coincided with ethnic groups,
they had to be dropped.  Variables that were insignificant in all four samples are not shown.
marginal effects for a model with a larger set of control variables are presented in Tables
5 and 6 for the probability of working and for the hours of work conditional  on working
respectively.  The  standard  marginal  effects  are  multiplied  by  0.1  for per  capita  food
expenditure  (Y)  because  this  is  in logarithms  and  for household  composition  variables
23because  these  are  proportions  and,  as  a result,  the  effects  of a  10%  change  in  these
variable can be directly read off the Table.
For landholdings,  the Smith-Blundell test did not reject exogeneity  and there was
no significant difference  in the IV and OLS  estimates. On the other hand, exogeneity was
rejected for food consumption  in each of the  samples other than that of boys  in Ghana.
The first  stage regression explains  31% of the variation  in consumption  in Pakistan and
29% in Ghana,  and the instruments  are jointly significant  at  1% and  10% respectively.
The results change  significantly (and in the expected direction)  if we do not instrument,
underlining  the  importance  of using  IV  methods  in  studying  the  impact  of household
income on child  work.  Since  most papers  investigating  child  labour do  not instrument
household  income (see Section 2.3), their estimates will tend to carry upward biases. The
rest  of this  section  presents  the  results,  first  for Ghana,  and then  for  Pakistan,  where
contrasts with Ghana are highlighted. Further analysis and a summary are presented in the
concluding section.
6.1. Resultsfor Ghana
Consider the parsimonious  model in Table 4. Farm size has a highly significant
positive effect for both boys and girls, the effect for girls being 50%  larger than that for
boys. Household per capita consumption has an unexpectedly positive effect on child
work,  even  after  correcting  for  its  endogeneity.  Boys  from  larger  households  work
significantly more while girls'  farm labour is independent of household size.
Adding  a range  of control  variables  (Tables  5-6)  makes a dramatic  difference  to these
results. The effects of farm size, consumption and household  size all become insignificant
for boys. For girls, a significant  positive  effect of farm  size persists, while consumption
and household size both become negative and significant.  For girls, therefore, each of the
three  main variables  takes  the  sign  predicted  by  theory  once appropriate  conditioning
variables  are  included. The absence  of a negative  income effect on the work of boys in
Ghana may be related to the fact that 75%  of these boys combine work and school  (see
Table I and equation (10)).
24Table 5: Child Participation on the Household  Farm: Marginal Effects
Paidstan boys  Pakistan Orfs  Ghana boys  Ghana ghis
Child  characteristics
Age (1  year)  0.081***  0.033***  0.15***  0.15***
Age-squared (1 year)  -0.0041  -0.0047*
Child of head (0/1)  0.12*  0.15**  -0.066**  -0.006
Household  resources
Ln p.c. food expend (0.1)  -0.051***  -0.017  0.0048  -0.021***
Acres (1 acre) x 102  0.069  0.20*  -0.071  0.36***
Acres2 (1 acre) x 1  0  -0.00015  -0.014**
Farm  oreanisaton
Numberoffarms (by  1)  0.046***  0.048***
Rent? (0/1)  -0.031  0.12**  0.14***  0.14***
Sharecrop? (0/1)  0.11***  0.06  -0.040  0.011
Free farm (0/1)  0.14***  0.16***
Village farm (0/1)  0.031  0.20***
Household  structure
Household size (1 person)  -0.024***  -0.011  -0.0055  -0.020***
Female head? (0/1)  0.39***  0.22**  0.036  0.080*
Males<5(7) yrs (0.1)  -0.079***  -0.031  -0.0041  -0.038***
Males 5-9 yrs (0.1)  -0.059*  -0.090***
Males 15-19 yrs(0.1)  -0.049  -0.051  -0.0065  -0.016
Males 20-59 yrs(0.1)  0.0043  -0.077**  -0.0057  0.024
Males >60 years (0.1)  -0.014  0.062  0.026  0.030
Females<5(7) yrs (0.1)  -0.037  0.011  0.022  -0.029**
Females 5-9 yrs (0.1)  0.015  -0.014
Females  15-19 yrs(0.1)  -0.13***  -0.054  -0.013  -0.0084
Females 20-59 yrs(0.1)  0.019  0.003  0.00014  0.0006
Females >60 years (0.1)  -0.079  -0.25***  0.0086  0.17
Parents'  education
Mother mid/sec (0/1)  -1.55***  -2.17***  -0.093***  -0.028
Father secondary (0/1)  0.12  -0.52***  -0.039  0.029
Communtiy variables
Primary school girls (0/1)  0.11  -0.17  -0.043  -0.064
Primary school, boys(0/1)  0.040  0.39***
Middle school(0/1)  -0.093***  -0.067*
Secondary school (0/1)  -0.099**  -0.128***
Public transport(0/1)  -0.048  -0.095**  -0.030  -0.12***
Residual  (Ipcfdexp)  0.041***  0.028*  0.0017  0.034***
N (#censored  obs)  471  (323)  436 (284)  1263 (720)  1122 (702)
Log likelihood  -847.78  -776.32  -2694.92  -2129.33
Notes:  See Table 4. These regressions  included region, religion  and ethnicity dummies.  Since
some regions for Ghana coincided with ethnic groups, they had to be dropped.
25Table 6: Hours of Child Farm Work Conditional on Participation: Marginal Effects
Poldtm akitau  Ghana  GhMa
BOYS  C  Gbi  Beys  G
Child characteristics
Age (1 year)  1.86***  0.46***  2.33***  2.25***
Age-squared (1 year)  -0.063  -0.069*
Child of  head (0/1)  2.70*  2.09**  -1.02**  -0.083
Household resources
Ln p.c. food expend (0.1)  -1.16***  -0.24  0.073  -0.31**
Acres (I acre) x 102  1.60  2.90*  1.10  5.40***
Acres2 (1 acre) x 10 4 -0.0024  -0.20**
Fawm organisaion
Number of fanns (by 1)  0.71***  0.70***
Rent (0/1)  -0.70  1.74**  2.09***  2.14***
Sharecrop  (0/1)  2.62***  0.78  -0.62  0.15
Free fann (0/1)  2.22***  2.32***
Village farm(0/1)  0.47  2.96***
Household  structure
Household size (by  1)  -0.54***  -0.16  -0.085  -0.30***
Female head? (0/1)  9.02***  3.06**  0.55  1.18*
Males <5(7) years (0.1)  -1.8***  -0.44  0.063  -0.56***
Males 5-9 years(0.1)  -1.35*  -1.27***
Males  15-19 years(0.1)  -1.11  -0.71  -0.10  -0.24
Males 20-59 years(0.1)  -0.098  -1.09**  0.088  0.36
Males >60 years (0.1)  -0.32  0.88  0.39  0.44
Females<5(7) yrs (0.1)  -0.86  0.16  0.34  -0.43**
Females 5-9 yrs (0.1)  0.35  -0.20
Females  15-19 yrs(0.1)  -2.86***  -0.76  -0.20  -0.12
Females 20-59 yrs(0.1)  0.43  0.045  0.0021  0.0096
Females over 60 yrs(0.1)  -1.81  -3.53***  0.13  0.25
Parents'  educa.tionl0/1)
Mother mid/sec (0/1)  -35.45***  -30.58***  -1.43***  -0.41
Father secondary (0/1)  2.75  -7.26***  -0.6  0.43
Communi  variables
Primary school girls (0/1)  2.43  -2.41  -0.67  -0.94
Primary school, boys(0/1)  0.90  5.43***
Middle school(0/1)  -1.43***  -0.98*
Secondary school (0/1)  -1.53**  -1.88***
Public transport(0/1)  -1.11  -1.34**  -0.46  -1.72***
Residual (lpcfdexp)  0.95***  0.40*  0.027  0.49***
N (#censored obs)  471(323)  436(284)  1263(720)  1122(702)
Log likelihood  -847.78  -776.32  -2694.92  -2129.33
Notes: See Notes to Table 4.
26The rest of this section summarises the effects of the additional variables in Tables
5 and 6. Child characteristics have broadly  similar effects for boys  and girls. Child work
increases  with  age at a  decreasing  rate.  A  complete  set of birth-order dummies  was
included but their coefficients  were poorly determined.  They were therefore replaced by a
single  indicator  variable  for whether  the  child  in  question  was  the  oldest  child  in the
household.  This too was insignificant  for both  genders and  since it is closely  related to
age,  it  was  dropped.  The  dummy  indicating  whether  the  child  was  the  child of the
household head (as  opposed  to nephew,  sibling,  foster  child,  etc)  is  negative  for both
genders and significant for boys. So there is some favour for sons.
Households  in  Ghana  often  own  several  plots  of  land,  with  ownership  often
divided  between men  and  women  in  a household  (e.g.  Udry,  1996).  We  find  a strong
positive effect of the number offarms operated  on hours of work,  of similar magnitude
for boys and girls.  Since this result obtains when controlling for acres of land operated by
the household, it suggests not a size effect but an effect associated with the subdivision of
land.  This merits further micro-level  research. The mode of operation  of land  (sharecrop,
rent etc) also matters.
Girls,  but  not  boys  exhibit  significantly  more  hours  of farm  work  in female-
headed  households. Indeed, there are no effects of household  composition on boys'  work.
A further significant  effect,  restricted to girls, is that they  work less in households with
male or female children under 7 years of age, that is, younger than themselves. The only
significant  effect  of the  parent  education  variables  is  that the  sons  of mothers with
secondary-level education work  less.  Since  this is  at given  levels  of household  living
standards, it would appear to reflect preferences  rather than resources.
Dummies for the presence ofprimary, middle and  secondary  schools in the cluster
take the  expected  negative  signs  and the  latter  two  are significant  for both  genders21.
Public transport in  the  village  has  a  negative  effect  that  is  restricted  to girls.  This  is
consistent with the hypothesis  that distance to school may  deter the attendance of girls
more than it does that of boys.  The region dummies are jointly very significant and have
larger effects  for girls (X26=58  for boys and X26=48  for girls, p>X 2=0  for both). Religion
has no  systematic  effect  on  boys'  work  (X22=2,  p>X2=0.37)  but  Christian  girls  work
21  The  significance  of cluster-specific  (or community)  variables  in  determining  child work in  Ghana  is
substantially  altered  once  standard errors are robust  and  cluster-adjusted.  All  equations report the correct
(adjusted) standard errors.
27significantly fewer hours on average than Animist girls  who work less than Muslim girls
(%22=5.3,  p>X 2=0.O7).  The  dummies  for  ethnicity  are  insignificant  for  girls  (X25=3.2,
p>X 2=0.67).  Boys  of Ewe  ethnicity are  significantly  less  likely  to  work  (X25-=  1.9,
p>X=0.>04).
6.2. Residtsfor  Pakistan
The  parsimonious  equations  in  Table  3 show  a positive  effect of farm  size on
girls'  work but the  positive  coefficient  estimated  for  boys  is  insignificant.  Household
consumption has the expected negative effect on child work but this is only significant for
boys22. For both boys and girls, hours of work fall significantly with household  size.
When additional  regressors are  included  (Tables  5-6),  all of these  effects  persist
except  for the  effect  of household  size  on  girls'  work,  which  becomes  insignificant.
Across both genders, the significant coefficients  take signs consistent with our theoretical
framework. The rest of this section considers the effects of the additional variables.
Child age has a positive  effect on hours worked,  which  is much larger for boys
than  for girls.  There  are  no birth order effects.  In  contrast  to Ghana,  children of the
household head in Pakistan are more likely than other children in the household to be at
work on the farm. As in Ghana, the mode of operation  of land impacts on child labour for
a given size of farm.
The  children of female-headed households in  Pakistan  work significantly  more
and the effect is bigger for boys than for girls. In Ghana this effect was restricted to girls.
These  results suggest that there  are  aspects of ill-being  or insecurity  in  female headed
households  that household  consumption  and  farm  size  do  not pick  up.  Controlling  for
household  size, there  are some fairly  complex  effects of the age-gender composition of
the household on child work in Pakistan,  in contrast with Ghana where these effects were
limited. Both boys and girls in Pakistan work less if they have young siblings. We found a
similar  effect  for Ghanaian  girls.  This  contradicts  evidence  from  other  regions which
finds  that  children  - and  especially  girls  - with  more  siblings  work  longer  hours  on
average  (see  Lloyd  (1993)  and  Jomo  (1992)).  In  addition,  girls  in  Pakistan  work
significantly  less  in households with a relatively high fraction  of adult  men and elderly
women.  The  fraction  of  adult men  may  indicate  the  degree  of insurance  achievable
22 The absence of an income effect  on girls'  work is somewhat surprising. It may be related to the fact that
boys work considerably longer hours than girls on average (Table 2).
28through  increased  labour market  activity in  response to a  shock (see  Kochar,  1995,  for
example).  The  greater  this  insurance,  the  smaller  the  dependence  on  child  labour  for
insurance.  Boys  work  less in  households  with  a  high fraction  of 15-19  year-old  girls.
There  is a significant negative  effect offathers'secondary  education that is restricted  to
girls. Mothers' education to the level of middle or secondary  school has a huge negative
effect  on  child work  for  both  genders,  in  contrast  to Ghana  where  mothers  education
reduces the work of boys but not girls.
The presence in the cluster of a primary  school for girls reduces the farm labour of
girls and, possibly because of sibling competition for resources,  the presence of a primary
school for boys increases girls' farm  labour. These school-access  variables have no effect
on boys'  work. The presence  of a bus route  (public  transport)  has a negative  effect  on
girls' work, just as in Ghana.  Province  dummies  (X23=11.7,  p>X2 -°.O)  and  religion
dummies  (X22=17.9,  p>X2=0.O)  are  jointly  significant  for  girls  though  not  for  boys
(X23=4.5  X22=2.9,  respectively).  Amongst  girls,  Christians  work  significantly  less  than
Muslims who work significantly less than other Non-Muslims. The tendency for Christian
girls to work relatively  less was also  seen for Ghana.  Christians  constitute  1.5% of the
population  and  other non-Muslims  (mostly Hindus)  account  for another  3.6%;  the vast
majority are Muslim.
63. Swnmary of  Resdts
Controlling  for  household  consumption,  household  size  and  ownership/tenancy
arrangements,  we identify  a positive effect of farm  size on girls'  work in both countries,
and no significant association for boys. This  suggests that the substitution effect is larger
for  girls  than  for boys,  which  is  consistent  with the  finding  in a  range  of developed
country data sets that female labour supply is more elastic than male labour supply. It also
coincides with the finding that the substitution effect is larger for girls than for boys in the
supply of wage labour in Pakistan (see Bhalotra, 2000a). With reference to our discussion
of different  substitution effects in Section 3,  it would  seem most likely that the positive
coefficient  on farm  size obtained for girls reflects a current-period  marginal  productivity
effect, its absence  for boys indicating  higher returns to school attendance (the alternative
use  of child time).  Although  boys  are more  likely  than girls to inherit  land, they  also
seem, in these countries,  to get higher monetary rewards from their education than girls.
So  it seems that the rewards  from education outweigh the rewards from work experience
29for boys. Moreover,  since boys rather than  girls  traditionally  look after their parents  in
their old age (except, possibly,  amongst the Akan in Ghana) this may motivate parents to
invest more in ensuring that they grow up to be rich!
A negative relation of child work and household food consumption per capita (our
proxy  for  income)  is  identified  for boys  in  Pakistan  and  girls  in  Ghana,  the  marginal
effect being much larger  in the former case23. In Pakistan, an  increase in consumption of
10% is estimated to reduce the probability of boys' work by 5 percentage points (so that,
at the mean, the  observed participation rate of 32% would fall to 26%)  and, conditional
on working, the same change in expenditure  is expected to reduce hours of work by 1.16
per week. The corresponding  effects for girls in Ghana are 2 percentage  points and 0.31
hours per week. For comparison  with existing empirical work on child labour,  it is worth
emphasising  that  we  would  find  weaker  income  effects  if we  did  not  account  for
simultaneity  bias.  Section  2  listed  reasons  why  the  existing  literature  may  not  have
identified  a  positive  relation  of household  poverty  and  child  work,  and  the  potential
misspecifications noted there were avoided in this paper. We nevertheless find no income
effect for the other two of the four groups of  children in our sample.
We  detect  significant  effects of land  tenure  type  (mode of operation)  on  child
labour  at given acreage.  No other study of child  labour appears to have  considered  this
factor.  We find that children  from  larger  households  are not more  likely to work or to
work harder. Female headship significantly increases child labour in every case except for
that of boys in Ghana. The size of this effect is much larger in Pakistan than in Ghana,
where  the  proportion  of  female-headed  households  is  enormously  larger  (30%  as
compared with  less than  3%).  There  are some  interesting and  large effects  of the  age-
gender  composition  of the  household  in Pakistan,  though  the corresponding  effects  in
Ghana  are  weak.  Father's  secondary  education  significantly  reduces  girls'  work  in
Pakistan but has no effect on the  labour of the  other three groups.  Mother's secondary
education tends to reduce  child hours of work  in both countries.  In Ghana this effect is
restricted  to  boys  but  in  Pakistan  it  is  significant  for boys  and  girls,  and of similar
magnitude.  These findings  reinforce  a growing  literature  on the  importance  of female
education  in achieving  positive  outcomes  for children across  a range  of countries.  The
23 The  negative income  effect  for girls  in  Ghana  did not appear  in the parsimonious  model  in  Table  3,
showing that its identification  relies upon introducing the set of controls.
30magnitude of the effects we find is so large that policy aimed at eliminating child work is
best targeted here.
7. Conclusions
Comparative work is useful in investigating whether there are behavioural patterns
relating to child work. While South Asia has the largest number of working children,  Sub-
Saharan  Africa  has  the  highest  incidence  of child  labour.  Even  though  it  claims  the
majority of child workers, the agricultural  work of children  is  severely  understudied  as
compared with the more visible forms of  work in Latin America and Asia, which involve
children  in labour-intensive  manufacturing.  The  results of the paper are interesting  not
only with regard to similarities and differences  between Pakistan and Ghana but also with
regard to gender differences.  The estimates obtained  in this paper permit consideration  of
the  effects  on child  labour  of,  for  example,  land  redistribution,  income  transfers  and
fertility change.
The  results are summarised  in Section  6.3.  The wealth paradox  observed  in the
original  data for both Ghana and Pakistan persists in the case of girls but vanishes  in the
case  of  boys,  once  we  condition  on  income  and  other  covariates.  The  results  are
consistent  with  our  hypothesis  that  imperfect  rural  labour  markets  can  explain  the
puzzling  fact that children of land-poor households  are often more  likely to be in school
than  the  children  of  land-rich  households.  Since  it  is  unlikely  that  girls  are  more
productive in farm labour than boys and inheritance effects are likely to be stronger in the
case of boys, the difference  in the results by gender  suggests that the (discounted) returns
to school for boys are perceived to be larger than for girls.
What are the implications of this paper for public policy? The paper underlines the
observation  that the  majority  of children  in developing  countries  work  as family-farm
labour.  As a  result,  policies  that have  been  recently  discussed  in  the  context  of child
labour- minimum wage legislation or trade sanctions-  have limited direct relevance to the
problem. If our inference is correct, then policy could work towards redressing the gender
imbalance  in  returns  to  education,  for  example,  by  targeting  girls  in  educational
programmes. We stress that labour market failure plays an important role in creating what
we call the wealth paradox. To the extent that problems such as moral hazard are easier to
manage  in competitive labour markets  (e.g. because the threat of firing is more credible),
interventions  that  encourage  development  of the  wage  labour  market  will  help,  for
31example,  improvements  in  the  roads  and  telecommunications  infrastructure.  Oddly
enough, the development of  land markets is likely to be closely linked to the development
of a good  school infrastructure:  People would be  more willing to buy and sell  physical
capital  like  land if they  had  human  capital  that they could  trade  in  a dynamic  labour
market.  Overall,  although  child labour may be a parental  choice  and it may be the  best
choice  given  the  constraints  people  face,  its prevalence  is a  symptom  of market  and
institutional  failures.  Identifying  these  is a first  step  in formulating  appropriate  policy
action.
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36Appendix Table 1
Variable Means for Workers and Non-Workers  by Gender
RURAL  GHANA
"Boys iim  Ghana  Girls in Ghana
Worken  Non-oerkers  Workers  Non-workers
#Observations  687  884  523  884
Dependent variable
hours  worked  on  15.5  0  15.5  0
farm
Child characteristics
age  10.9  9.8  10.9  9.7
first child  0.61  0.47  0.64  0.48
child of head of hh  0.77  0.84  0.72  0.81
Household
resources
in  pc  food  -0.33  -0.40  -0.27  -0.39
expenditure
acres of land  9.34  8.23  9.77  7.57
Size of farm
number of farms  2.0  1.94  2.1  1.92
rent land?  0.086  0.055  0.071  0.083
sharecrop land?  0.070  0.067  0.067  0.066
freely available  0.23  0.15  0.21  0.15
land?
village-owned land?  0.23  0.26  0.24  0.28
Household structure
household size  7.3  7.2  6.9  7.3
female head?  0.27  0.20  0.34  0.22
malesunder7years  0.10  0.11  0.091  0.11
males 7-14 years  0.28  0.28  0.10  0.095
males  15-19 years  0.059  0.049  0.059  0.049
males 20-59 years  0.10  0.11  0.11  0.11
males over 60 years  0.033  0.032  0.032  0.028
females under 7 yrs  0.098  0.097  0.097  0.103
females 7-14 years  0.085  0.088  0.27  0.26
females  15-19 years  0.041  0.034  0.037  0.039
females 20-59 years  0.16  0.18  0.18  0.18
females  over  60  0.033  0.020  0.037  0.019
years
37Appendix Table 1: (cont'd)




mother none  0.68  0.66  0.66  0.69
mother primary  0.15  0.11  0.13  0.14
mother secondary  0.17  0.23  0.21  0.17
father none  0.51  0.49  0.46  0.53
father primary  0.086  0.088  0.079  0.085
father secondary  0.40  0.42  0.46  0.38
Community
variables
local primary school  0.85  0.89  0.87  0.88
local middle school  0.61  0.64  0.70  0.63
local secondary  0.14  0.11  0.11  0.10
school
local public transport  0.52  0.50  0.52  0.47
Regions
Central Region  0.14  0.083  0.15  0.10
Eastem Region  0.028  0.25  0.027  0.21
West  0.096  0.11  0.12  0.11
Volta Region  0.14  0.088  0.14  0.081
Ashanti Region  0.24  0.078  0.26  0.078
Brong Ahafo Region  0.13  0.13  0.15  0.14
North  0.08  0.11  0.05  0.12
Upper West  0.04  0.04  0.03  0.05
UpperEast  0.08  0.10  0.08  0.11
Ethnic groups
Akan  0.57  0.48  0.61  0.46
Ewe  0.038  0.058  0.056  0.059
Ga-adangbe  0.038  0.11  0.024  0.089
Dagbani  0.054  0.041  0.028  0.049
Nzema  0.013  0.013  0.015  0.017
Other  0.29  0.30  0.26  0.32
Relinon
Christian  0.61  0.60  0.65  0.58
Animist/traditional  0.19  0.25  0.16  0.25
Muslim  0.20  0.15  0.19  0.17
Notes:  See Notes to Table 4. Per capita expenditure  for Ghana is expressed as a ratio to its
mean, not so for Pakistan. This makes no effective difference to the tobit estimates since the
variable is in logarithms and there is an equation constant.
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Variable Means for Workers and Non-Workers by Gender
RURAL PAKISTAN
Boys  in Pakistan  Girls in Pakistan
Workers  Non-workers  Workers  Non-workers
#Observations  191  427  200  365
Dependent variable
hours  worked  on  25.6  0  14.9  0
farm
Chid characteristics
age  12.2  11.6  12.0  11.8
first child  0.69  0.50  0.63  0.60
child of head of hh  0.85  0.78  0.87  0.79
Household
resources
In pc food  5.28  5.36  5.36  5.34
expenditure
acresofland  11.8  11.3  12.0  9.82
Size of faym
rent land?  0.13  0.15  0.16  0.16
sharecrop  land?  0.48  0.33  0.43  0.30
Household structure
household size  9.6  11.2  9.8  10.9
female head?  0.03  0.01  0.045  0.014
males under 5 years  0.051  0.056  0.062  0.060
males 5-9 years  0.10  0.196  0.095  0.089
males 10-14 years  0.18  0.16  0.072  0.052
males  15-19 years  0.052  0.068  0.060  0.061
males 20-59 years  0.16  0.16  0.15  0.17
males over 60 years  0.027  0.028  0.033  0.026
females under 5 yrs  0.059  0.064  0.070  0.063
females 5-9 years  0.10  0.084  0.090  0.086
females 10-14 years  0.060  0.051  0.16  0.17
females 15-19 years  0.039  0.051  0.044  0.049
females 20-59years  0.16  0.16  0.15  0.16
females  over  60  0.014  0.021  0.0094  0.025
years
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Variable Means for Workers and Non-Workers by Gender
RURAL PAKISTAN
'q~  - Rt  Girs i  PaisPta
Wokmv  Nmwoi*m  wers  Non-workers
Parents' education
mother none  0.98  0.97  0.99  0.94
mother  primary  or  0.023  0.021  0.011  0.046
less
mother  0.00  0.008  0.00  0.012
mid/secondary
father none  0.66  0.63  0.71  0.61
father  primary  or  0.22  0.21  0.20  0.19
less
father middle  0.067  0.064  0.066  0.082
father secondary  0.056  0.092  0.020  0.12
community
variables
boy's primary school  0.88  0.91  0.93  0.90
boy's middle school  0.44  0.44  0.38  0.41
girl's primary school  0.85  0.86  0.87  0.82
girl's middle school  0.28  0.28  0.25  0.26
local  public  0.66  0.62  0.60  0.62
transport'
Punjab  0.50  0.47  0.42  0.47
Baluchistan  0.031  0.054  0.020  0.082
Sindh  0.31  0.26  0.39  0.21
Northwest Frontier  0.16  0.22  0.17  0.24
Relizion
Muslim  0.91  0.96  0.89  0.98
Christian  0.031  0.007  0.030  0.008
Non-Muslim  0.058  0.033  0.080  0.017
Notes:  See  Notes  to  Appendix  Table  1. ':Corresponds  to  the  presence  of a  bus  route
through the cluster.
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This paper  is motivated  by the observation that children  in  land-rich
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